IMPROVEMENT IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: A RESPONSE TO MONETARY POLICY OR TO AD HOC FISCAL POLICIES ALLAN H. MELTZER*
T HE events of the past few years have alerted economists and non-economists alike to the difficulty of choosing appropriate monetary policies while making the implicit assumption that the economy is closed. The problems posed for policy-makers by the existence of a deficit in the balance of payments and a continued gold outflow are familiar enough. Indeed, the balance-of-payments deficit and the gold outflow have received so much recent attention that it is perhaps time to recall that there are also dangers in ignoring or minimizing certain domestic effects of monetary policy. The dangers result from the tendency to equate monetary policy with its effect upon interest rates and its effects on gold outflows and balance-of-payments deficits through interest rates.
My conclusion that the domestic effects of changes in money are often ignored is based on several sources. Some of these are familiar; for example, the analysis that was widely used to support the 1964 tax cut in the United States, and recent governmental policy statements suggesting that monetary policy be used for balance-of-payments purposes, while fiscal policy be used to stimulate the domestic economy. is reflected in a reduced growth rate of the money supply. Enticing as it is to speculate about the present direction of policy, it is probably more fruitful to discuss the rationale used to justify the policy actions of the last few years.
THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF RECENT MONETARY POLICY
Like other policy prescriptions, present policy reflects an explicit or implicit analysis of the causal mechanisms that are at work in the economy. Four assumptions seem to play a particular role in the analysis. These assumptions are (1) fixed exchange rates will be maintained or at least the United States will use its power to maintain the dollar price of gold; (2) wages are rigid downward; (3) gold flows are sensitive to interestrate movements, and a rise in domestic rates, particularly short-term rates relative to foreign rates, reduces gold outflow; (4) household and business expenditures are relatively insensitive to interest-rate movements.
The first assumption concerns political realities and social goals. It is a statement about the influence of those who believe that continued gold outflows or changes in the exchange rate will have a deleterious effect upon people's confidence in our military might, our economic strength, and our determination to resist Mao Tse Tung-or some combination of the three. The last three assumptions are specifications about magnitudes of response within some model or theory. Some have been obtained by careful em-267 268 THE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS pirical research, others by the more familiar method of plausible assertion. In the case at hand, the underlying theory is of the income-expenditure, or Keynesian, type. Given the theory and the assumptions about response magnitudes, the conclusions follow. Monetary policy can be used to raise short-term interest rates and reduce the gold outflow; fiscal policy can be used to stimulate the domestic economy.
The problem is that our recent experience and implications of the analysis do not jibe. One would expect from the underlying theory that, in periods when the money supply was declining or growing very slowly and the government deficit was relatively large, the gold outflow would be reduced and economic activity would expand. At such times, according to the theory, interest rates are high and the outflow of short-term capital is small or is replaced by an inflow. When there is a surplus or small budget deficit, the theory predicts that interest rates are low and unemployment rates are high. At such times the gold outflow should increase. But in 1958,1959,1960, and 1962, years of slow monetary growth or declining money supply, the balance-of-payments deficits were among the largest in recent years and the gold outflows were substantially larger than in almost any other recent year. In 1964, the year in which the money supply grew at one of the fastest rates in contemporary or longer-term peacetime history, the balance-of-payments deficit declined for the first three quarters of the year, the gold outflow was the smallest in recent years, and there began to be talk of a permanent improvement in the balance of payments.
The last recession we have experienced started in 1960, a year in which the money supply declined. Since 1960, the growth rate of the money supply has generally been positive, and the growth rate of the money supply for 1963 and 1964 was approximately 4 per cent on the average. As in the past, income expanded during the years of substantial monetary expansion and declined following substantial decline in the rate of monetary expansion. A similar analysis could be used to show that there is little relation between current or lagged values of the government deficit and current growth rates in real income. These facts are difficult to subsume under a theory that says or implies that restrictive monetary policies are well suited for improving the balance of payments or reducing gold outflows, and that fiscal policy is the appropriate policy for increasing the pace of economic activity.
Let me make clear that I am not suggesting that the deficit resulting from the 1964 tax cut or earlier government deficits had no effect on the pace of economic activity. But observations cast up by our recent experience make it difficult to accept as correct a theory that tells us that the rate of monetary expansion has its principal effect on the gold outflow and not on the domestic economy, that it makes little or no difference for the rate of domestic economic expansion whether the government's deficit is financed by issuing interest-bearing debt or money, and that, by pursuing a policy of monetary restriction, we have prevented a gold outflow and encouraged an inflow of short-term foreign balances. An alternative explanation of the recent movements in real income, in the balance-of-payments deficit and in the gold stock, that is more in keeping with the record of our recent experience, seems to be required. If these interpretations of the evidence are correct, there is reason to expect that the balance-of-payments problem will remain with us for some time. Thus far, most of the effect of the high rate of recent monetary expansion has been on real income. The effect on price levels is just beginning to become apparent. As the rise in the U.S. price level becomes larger, some of the reduction in the relative price of U.S. exports will be offset, the extent of the offset depending on the relative rates of inflation in various countries and the price elasticities of traded commodities.
Since a part of 1964's improvement on trade account was the transitory effect of grain sales to eastern Europe, the sacrifice of a part of our improved price position has a serious consequence. It threatens to reduce further the amount of improvement in our current position. Possibly in anticipation of this problem, the Federal Reserve may have acted to reduce the rate of monetary expansion. The growth rate of the money supply slowed after November, 1964. Since the growth rate of the money supply is almost always quite erratic, because of the Federal Reserve's undue concern for money market conditions, it is difficult to know from month to month precisely what growth rate is being achieved. But over the period from November through March, the growth rate of the money supply at annual rates has been 1.3 per cent, slower than the growth rate of population, and slower than the long-term monetary growth rate that is required to maintain expanding real income. If the slow rate of monetary expansion continues, a slowing of the pace of economic activity should be observed within the next few months. Should this occur, the economic situation will be analogous to the situation in 1961-62, with relatively high unemployment rates and a balanceof-payments deficit. What do we do if that happens? SOME ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS One policy proposal is to continue as we have in the past. This method can be characterized as one of prayer, threats, and a strong dose of expansive monetary and fiscal policy. The prayer is that there will be more inflation in Europe than in the United States; the threats are that we will invoke more domestic controls, more restrictions on capital movements, perhaps stronger price and wage guidelines, or even some form of price and wage controls to prevent the fiscal and monetary policies from showing up in the balance-of-payments statistics.
The basis for this policy is very difficult to understand. It is often closely tied to the arguments for fixed exchange rates and is defended with the best of intentions and with statements of high principle about the importance of confidence in the dollar, about the maintenance of the U.S. position in the world economy, and about the provision of something called "discipline." Many of the arguments used to defend the position are so vague that they cannot be easily refuted. But they seem to carry the presumption that, without the restrictions imposed by the loss of gold and without the desire to maintain a fixed exchange rate, U.S. policy would be one of reckless monetary expansion at rates considerably larger than those of the past.
There is so little evidence for this presumption in the record of U.S. monetary history that it is difficult to believe that those who advance the argument have ever looked at our history. During peacetime the average rate of monetary growth has rarely been inflationary. There is little reason to believe that the rate of monetary expansion that has been observed in the past would increase suddenly if we were not "disciplined" by the balance of payments. Moreover, the data for recent years suggest that monetary expansion has been about twice as high during the past two years of balance-ofpayments difficulties than it was on the average of the postwar years as a whole. It is not clear at all that the restriction or so-called discipline has been important.
A major argument of those who wish discipline and fixed exchange rates, particularly the latter, is that fixed exchange rates are of advantage because they stimulate trade. The argument is that fixed exchange rates remove most of the uncertainty about future exchange rates and thereby encourage businessmen to engage in international commerce. It is difficult to know how important this argument is, but let us assume that increased certainty has an important effect on the volume of international trade. Further assume, contrary to what might be expected, that there would not be an active, forward foreign-exchange market in which businessmen could eliminate uncertainty about exchange rates if these prices were allowed to vary. Now let us inquire how fixed exchange rates have worked in recent years to stimulate trade and eliminate uncertainty. In place of speculation about the future movements of flexible exchange rates, there is speculation about the devaluation of particular currencies. A few years ago speculation centered on the dollar; in the recent past the pound has received attention. Although it may seem strange today, past speculation centered on the franc. It is not inconceivable that at some time in the future there will be speculation about the future of the mark or again about the dollar or the pound. Fixed exchange rates have not eliminated uncertainty-only the form has been changed. In place of the type of uncertainty that businessmen can eliminate by operating in an active, forward market, we have the type of uncertainty that is not easily eliminated in this manner because an active, profitable, forward market does not become established in a regime of fixed exchange rates. Furthermore, the policies used to maintain fixed exchange rates involve an increasing number of restrictions on capital movements and property rights. To maintain the asserted benefits of fixed exchange rates, including the stimulus to trade that they are said to bring, restrictions that lower the efficiency of the international economic system have been introduced, and others are threatened. These restrictions are a high price to pay for the unknown volume of increased trade induced by the unknown amount of increased certainty.
There may be a combination of prayer and threat that will eventually bring the balance-of-payments problem of the United States to an end. But the record of the past is not overly promising, and it is useful to consider some alternatives.
A A rather indirect form of evidence about what might be expected to happen if this policy were adopted comes from a more recent period. In 1951, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve agreed to stop maintaining a fixed minimum price of long-term bonds. Before this step was taken, fears were expressed that the bond market would be unstable, unsettled, or chaotic if the market were given an important role in the determination of bond prices. A number of seemingly persuasive arguments were advanced to that effect. The record shows, however, that the bond market was not unsettled after the peg was removed. In fact, the movement of interest rates in 1951, after the accord, was smaller than reasonably might have been expected. Interest rates did not rise precipitously, and bond prices did not vary in a manner that could be described as chaotic. Instead, interest rates adjusted slowly from 1951 to a peak in 1953.
It will be recalled that the removal of the peg from interest rates in 1951 was done at a time that was less than propitious. The Korean war was under way, there was much talk of the danger of inflation, and the economy was in the early part of an upswing from the low level of economic activity that prevailed in 1949 and early 1950. The conditions were ripe for speculators to cause unsettled conditions in the bond market-if that is what speculators do. Unsettled conditions did not occur, a conclusion that is at least consistent with the view that we need not expect chaos if the market is allowed to establish the dollar price of gold. 6 There are numerous additional examples of the removal of governmental restrictions followed by a great deal more price stability than had been anticipated. But let me conclude the argument for a market-determined price of gold in terms of dollars by stating that I do not know of any persuasive evidence suggesting that such an arrangement is destabilizing.
CONCLUSION
In the past few years a number of myths about the U.S. economy have been repeated with great frequency. There is the myth that monetary contraction or a slow rate of monetary growth has been the important source of improvement in the balance-of-payments position. In fact, the rate of monetary expansion has 6 There is a tendency to dismiss any unilateral effort to let the market determine the exchange rate because of the Canadian experience in the fifties. There is little reason to dispute the fact that the policy failed in Canada, but general conclusions should not be drawn hastily. Canadian and U.S. monetary policies played an important part in the failure of the experiment.
